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Abstract
The classical models of evolution have been developed to incorporate structured
populations using evolutionary graph theory and, more recently, a new frame-
work has been developed to allow for more flexible population structures which
potentially change through time and can accommodate multiplayer games with
variable group sizes. In this paper we extend this work in three key ways. Firstly
by developing a complete set of evolutionary dynamics (BDB, BDD, DBD, DBB,
LB and LD) so that the range of dynamic processes used in classical evolution-
ary graph theory can be applied. Secondly, by building upon previous models to
allow for a general subpopulation structure, where all subpopulation members
have a common movement distribution. Subpopulations can have varying lev-
els of stability, represented by the proportion of interactions occurring between
subpopulation members; in our representation of the population all subpopula-
tion members are represented by a single vertex. In conjunction with this we
extend the important concept of temperature (the temperature of a vertex is
the sum of all the weights coming into that vertex; generally, the higher the
temperature, the higher the rate of turnover of individuals at a vertex). Finally,
we have used these new developments to consider the evolution of cooperation
in a class of populations which possess this subpopulation structure using a
multiplayer public goods game. We show that cooperation can evolve providing
that subpopulations are sufficiently stable, with the smaller the subpopulations
the easier it is for cooperation to evolve. We introduce a new concept of tem-
perature, namely “subgroup temperature”, which can be used to explain our
results.
1. Introduction1
Evolutionary game theory has proved to be a very successful way of mod-2
elling the evolution of, and behaviour within, populations. The classical models3
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mainly focused on well-mixed populations playing two player games [31, 30], or4
alternatively playing games against the entire population [30]. Simple models5
such as the Hawk-Dove game [29] and the sex ratio game [20] have been used6
to explain important biological phenomena.7
These models were developed to consider finite populations explicitly [34,8
Chapters 6-9] (although see [32, 33] for important earlier non-game theoretic9
work) and structured populations using the now widespread methodology of10
evolutionary graph theory originated in [26] (see also [3, 9, 52, 27], and [1, 44]11
for reviews). Such population structures can have a profound effect on the result12
of the evolutionary process even when individuals have a fixed fitness [26, 28, 40].13
Further, even for a given structure, the rules of the evolutionary dynamics have14
a significant effect on the evolution of the population.15
Previous work has investigated a number of important questions, the most16
widely considered being how cooperation can evolve. The evolution of cooper-17
ation, where individuals make sacrifices to help others, can seem paradoxical18
within the context of natural selection, especially amongst unrelated individu-19
als. There are a number of ways that mathematical modelling has demonstrated20
that cooperation can occur [35]; one key way is through the presence of popula-21
tion structure, which can mean that cooperative individuals are more likely to22
interact with other cooperators, which makes them resistant to exploitation by23
defectors [36, 42]. In particular, this is true for structures where individuals are24
heterogeneous [43] allowing hubs or clusters of cooperators to form. The dynam-25
ics that one uses are also important; for example [36] showed that death-birth or26
birth-death dynamics with selection on the second event promotes cooperation27
but not when selection happens in the first event.28
One limitation of evolutionary graph theory is that it naturally lends itself29
to pairwise games, whereas real populations can often involve the simultaneous30
interaction of many individuals [45, 15]. Multiplayer games, whilst more com-31
mon in economic modelling [21, 6], have become used in increasing frequency32
within evolutionary games starting with [38, 7] (see also [14, 18]) and it is im-33
portant to incorporate these too into the modelling of structured populations.34
A multiplayer public goods game [4, 5, 19, 54], (and this type of game is central35
to our paper too, see Section 2.4) has been used in evolutionary graph theory36
[25, 51, 24, 41, 56], but this typically involves forming an individual and all of37
its neighbours into a group and allowing them to play a game. Although this is38
convenient, it is not really natural because there is no mechanism for deciding39
how individuals spend their time, and so how they share that time with others,40
either singly or in groups.41
More recently a general framework has been developed [10, 13, 8, 11] which42
considers the interaction of populations in a more flexible way, where groups of43
any size can form, with different propensity potentially depending upon a num-44
ber of factors, including the history of the process. Crucially, the key elements45
of evolutionary graph theory of population structure, game and evolutionary46
dynamics occur for this new framework too; this makes it capable of analysing47
different spatial structures whilst providing the flexibility for different multi-48
player interactions. Prior to the current paper, the actual applications of the49
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Figure 1: The fully independent model from [10]. There are N individuals who are distributed
over M places such that In visits place Pm with probability pnm. Individuals interact with
one another when they meet, for example, I1 and I2 can interact with one another when they
meet in P1.
above framework have been limited. In particular only a single evolutionary50
dynamics (the BDB dynamics from the current paper) has been used, and only51
relatively simple populations, which resembled those in evolutionary graph the-52
ory (the population consisting of individuals each resident at a unique graph53
vertex) have been considered.54
In this paper we further develop the general theory of the framework orig-55
inated in [10]. We first show how to represent subpopulations using a reduced56
graphical representation within our structure, which will then allow us to po-57
tentially consider larger populations with a richer structure than previously. We58
then demonstrate how to apply a standard set of evolutionary dynamics to con-59
sider a range of evolutionary processes. This is vital since, as mentioned above,60
dynamics can have a big effect on the outcome of evolution within other models,61
including evolutionary graph theory, and as we will see, this is certainly also62
true for our work. Finally we use these new tools to consider the evolution of63
cooperation using a multiplayer public goods game [51, 48, 49, 4] and show that64
cooperation can occur when both the structure and evolutionary dynamics act65
together in favour of the cooperators.66
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 the model framework is67
described, including how to incorporate subpopulations. In Section 3 a standard68
set of evolutionary dynamics to be used with our model are defined. In Section69
4 we introduce and discuss the important concepts of fixation probability and70
temperature. In Section 5 we study the evolution of cooperation in our model71
with subpopulations. Section 6 is then a general discussion.72
2. A framework for modelling evolution in structured populations73
A framework for modelling the movement of individuals was presented in74
[10]. This is a very general and flexible methodology, the details of which are75
not necessary for the current paper. Below we describe the fully independent76
version of this framework in which individuals move independently of each other77
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Table of Notation
Notation Definition Description
N ∈ Z+ \ {0} Population size.
M ∈ Z+ \ {0} Number of places.
In Individual n.
Pm Place m.
G ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , N} Group of individuals.
pnm ∈ [0, 1] Probability that In is in Pm.
χ(m,G) ∈ [0, 1] Probability of group G forming in place Pm.
Fn ∈ (0,∞) Fitness of individual In.
Rn,m,G ∈ [0,∞] Payoff to In in G present in Pm.
h ∈ (0,∞) Home fidelity.
d ∈ Z+ \ {0} Number of neighbours.
r, v ∈ (0,∞) Background fitness, reward.
C,D Cooperator, Defector.
RCc,d ∈ [0,∞) Payoff to cooperator in a group (including it-
self) of c cooperators and d defectors.
Rn,G ∈ [0,∞) Payoff to In in group G.
S = {n : In is cooperator } State of the population.
N = {1, 2, . . . , N} State in which all individuals are cooperators.
PSS′ ∈ [0, 1] State transition probability.
ρCS ∈ [0, 1] Probability of fixating in N when initial state
is S.
ρC ∈ [0, 1] Mean fixation probability of a cooperator.
W = (wij) wij ∈ (0,∞) Weighted adjacency matrix that represents an
evolutionary graph.
vn Vertex n of an evolutionary graph.
bi ∈ [0, 1] Probability Ii is selected for birth.
dij ∈ [0, 1] Probability Ii replaces Ij given Ii is selected
for birth.
di ∈ [0, 1] Probability Ii is selected for death.
bij ∈ [0, 1] Probability Ii replaces Ij given Ij is selected
for death.
rij ∈ [0, 1] Probability Ii replaces Ij .
T+i =
∑
j wij Out temperature of Ii.
T−i =
∑
j wji In temperature of Ij .
Qm ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , N} Subpopulation of individuals.
TQm =
∑
i∈N\Qm
∑
j∈Qm wij Strict subpopulation temperature.
Table 1: Notation used in the paper.
and independently of the population’s history (any past movements). Important78
terms used in the current paper are given in Table 1.79
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2.1. The fully independent model80
The population is made up of N individuals I1, . . . , IN who can move around81
M places P1, . . . , PM . The probability of individual In being at place Pm is82
denoted by pnm; see Figure 1 for a visual representation using a bi-partite83
graph. When individuals move around they form groups. Let G denote any84
group of individuals, then the probability χ(m,G) that group G forms in place85
Pm is given by86
χ(m,G) =
∏
i∈G
pim
∏
j /∈G
(1− pjm). (2.1)87
88
We can show from equation (2.1) that89
1 =
∑
m
∑
G
n∈G
χ(m,G) ∀n. (2.2)90
91
This follows intuitively from the fact that individual In has to be present in some92
place Pm in some group G at any given time. The mean size of an individual’s93
group (see also [13]) is given by94
G¯ =
∑
m
∑
G
χ(m,G)|G|2∑
m
∑
G χ(m,G)|G|
=
∑
m
∑
G
χ(m,G)|G|2
N
(2.3)95
96
where the simplification of the denominator follows from equation (2.2).97
When a group of individuals is formed they will then interact with one98
another. In particular, individual In will receive a payoff that depends upon99
the group G it is present in and the place Pm occupied by this group. This100
is denoted as Rn,m,G and was referred to in [10] as a direct group interaction101
payoff because individual In only interacts with other individuals with whom it102
is directly present with ([10] allowed for a more general class of payoff but this103
is the only type we will consider, and hence will just refer to it as the payoff).104
Individual In’s fitness is then calculated by averaging its payoffs over all possible105
groups and places that these groups can form as follows:106
Fn =
∑
m
∑
G
n∈G
χ(m,G)Rn,m,G . (2.4)107
A version of the fully independent model called the territorial raider model108
was introduced in [10] and further developed in [8]. A generalization of this109
model forms the basis of much of the work in this paper, although we note that110
Section 3 in particular is more general.111
2.2. The territorial raider model112
In the territorial raider model, each individual In has its own place Pn with113
no unoccupied places and, therefore, there is a one-to-one correspondence be-114
tween individuals and places. A graph is used to represent the structure of the115
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Figure 2: The territorial raider model of [10, 8]. (a) Population structure represented using a
graph where vertices represent individuals and places. Individual In lives in place Pn and can
visit any neighbouring places. For example, the home place of I1 is place P1 but it can visit
places P2, P3 and P4. (b) An alternative visualization on a bi-partite graph where individuals
and places are clearly separated.
population where each vertex represents an individual and its corresponding116
home such that two connected individuals can raid each others home places117
(see Figure 2). The probability of raiding another’s home place is governed by118
a common movement parameter called home fidelity, h, that measures an in-119
dividuals’ preference for their home place. In particular, an individual with d120
neighbours would stay on their home place with probability h/(h + d) or raid121
any one of its neighbours’ home places with an equal probability of 1/(h + d)122
(see Figure 2).123
I1, I2 I3, I4 I5
(a)
I1 I2 I3 I4 I5
P1 P2 P3
(b)
Figure 3: The generalized territorial raider model. (a) Individuals that are members of sub-
population Qm live in place Pm but can visit neighbouring places. The territory of subpop-
ulation {I1, I2} consists of places P1 and P2, the territory of subpopulation {I3, I4} consists
of places P1, P2 and P3, the territory of subpopulation {I5} consists of P2 and P3. (b) An
alternative visualization as multiplayer interactions on a bi-partite graph where individuals
and places are clearly separated.
2.3. The generalized territorial raider model124
In this section we generalise the territorial raider model to include subpopu-125
lations, based upon their movement distributions. We will see that individuals126
within a given subpopulation are more likely to interact with each other than127
with members of other subpopulations, and this will affect the success of their128
strategies.129
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Consider the fully independent model. We define a subpopulation of individ-130
uals as a division of individuals from the main population that is well-mixed [10],131
which simply means that all of these individuals have an identical distribution132
over the places. In particular, for a subpopulation Q we have that pim = pjm133
∀ i, j ∈ Q and m = 1, . . . ,M . This can be visualised in terms of a bipartite134
graph as in Figure 1 where the I-vertices are now occupied by subpopulations135
rather than individuals. This subpopulation structure is thus a special case of136
the fully independent model.137
For simplicity we will assume that individuals move as they do in the terri-138
torial raider model; thus our model is a generalization of the territorial raider139
model. A population of N individuals is divided into M non-overlapping sub-140
populations Q1, . . . ,QM where |Qm| ≥ 0 such that N =
∑
m |Qm|. We will141
assume that individuals in subpopulation Qm treat place Pm as their home142
place, so that there is a one-to-one correspondence between subpopulations and143
places. However, because we allow subpopulations to be empty, we can have144
places in which no individuals reside. As before, the movement probabilities of145
the individuals is governed by the home fidelity h. In particular, a subpopula-146
tion Qm that can visit d neighbouring places will stay in home place Pm with147
probability h/(h+d) or move to one of its neighbouring places with probability148
1/(h + d). Note that when there is one individual in each subpopulation, that149
is |Qm| = 1 ∀m, we recover the territorial raider model in Section 2.2. This150
information can be visually represented in two different ways as shown in Fig-151
ure 3, which includes a graph whose vertices represent both subpopulations and152
places. This generalized territorial raider model will be the basis of our detailed153
investigation of the evolution of cooperation in Section 5.154
2.4. A multiplayer public goods game155
A multiplayer Hawk-Dove game [46] and a public goods game were con-156
sidered in [8], though there are other games that can be considered like the157
multiplayer stag hunt game [37].158
In this paper we focus only on the multiplayer public goods game based on159
the game defined by [51], where an individual’s payoff is an average of two player160
public goods games (just a version of the standard prisoner’s dilemma) played161
with each of its group mates. Players can either cooperate (C) or defect (D).162
A cooperator always pays a cost 1 so that the other player receives a reward163
v and a defector pays no cost but only receives a reward when present with a164
cooperator. Note that the cost is set to 1 because scaling all the payoffs by165
some other cost value does not affect the outcome of the game and, therefore,166
the reward v is a multiple of the cost. The payoff matrix is thus given by167
C D
C v − 1 −1
D v 0
. (2.5)168
169
In [51] and most models involving public goods games, individuals are never170
alone, and so what happens in the case they are alone is not considered. How-171
ever, in our case it is possible for an individual to be alone, for example, an172
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individual could remain on its home place and not be raided. As in [8], we will173
assume that a lone cooperator still pays a cost but does not receive a reward174
and lone defectors receive nothing. There are other ways that we can allocate175
rewards to lone individuals; for example, in [22] there is a specific strategy, the176
loner strategy, where cooperators choose to be alone and not pay a cost. Our177
choice seems a natural generalisation of the prisoners dilemma model [51], where178
individuals pay a cost but do not benefit from their own contributions. We note179
that our version makes cooperation harder to evolve than the alternatives. Thus180
if cooperators thrive in a population using our model, this can be thought of as181
strong support for the evolution of cooperation.182
In the multiplayer public goods game, the payoffs to cooperators and defec-183
tors playing within a group of c cooperators and d defectors (including them-184
selves) is then respectively given by185
RCc,d =
{
r − 1, c = 1
r − 1 + c−1c+d−1v, c > 1
and RDc,d =
{
r, c = 0
r + cc+d−1v, c > 0
(2.6)186
187
where r is a background payoff, which is also a multiple of the cost, that every188
individual receives, representing the contribution from activities that are not189
related to the games. Generally, the effect of selection is weaker the larger190
the value of r (for example, see [12], Chapter 2). The payoff is then given by191
Rn,m,G ≡ RCc,d (≡ RDc,d) when In is a cooperator (defector) and |G| = c+d, which192
can then be substituted into Equation 2.4 to find the individual’s fitness. Note193
that here the payoffs do not depend upon the place occupied by the individuals,194
that is, Rn,m,G ≡ Rn,G .195
3. Evolutionary dynamics196
In this section we revisit the standard dynamics of evolutionary graph theory,197
before demonstrating how we can adapt each of them to our framework. For198
the current work there will actually only be two distinct dynamics, but for more199
general cases each will be distinct, and so it is important to consider them all.200
We start by recalling the dynamics from evolutionary graph theory.201
3.1. Evolutionary dynamics in evolutionary graph theory202
An evolutionary graph [26, 40] is a graph represented by a weighted adja-203
cency matrix W = (wij) where wij ∈ [0,∞) is referred to as the replacement204
weight. Each vertex vn of the evolutionary graph is occupied by one individual205
and if wij > 0 then the individual on vi can place a copy of itself in vj by206
replacing the individual there. It is assumed that the weights are chosen so that207
the evolutionary graph is strongly connected, which means that there is a route208
of finite length between any pair of vertices vi and vj . The weighted adjacency209
matrix W is therefore said to define the replacement structure.210
Assuming that there is only one replacement per update event, there are211
several different ways to calculate the probability of a replacement event rij212
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Dynamics
BDB bi =
Fi∑
n Fn
, dij =
wij∑
n win
BDD bi =
1
N
, dij =
wijF
−1
j∑
n winF
−1
n
DBD dj =
F−1j∑
n F
−1
n
, bij =
wij∑
n wnj
DBB dj =
1
N
, bij =
wijFi∑
n wnjFn
LB rij =
wijFi∑
n,k wnkFn
LD rij =
wijF
−1
j∑
n,k wnkF
−1
k
Table 2: Dynamics defined using the replacement weight as in [40]. In each case, B (D) is
appended to the name of the dynamics if selection happens in the birth (death) event.
where a copy of the individual on vi replaces the individual on vj . In particular,213
we can broadly classify these in terms of the order in which vi and vj are214
picked. For birth-death dynamics (BD) the birth event happens first where the215
individual on vi is chosen for birth with probability bi. The individual on vj216
is then chosen for death conditional on the individual on vi giving birth with217
probability dij , thus rij = bidij . For death-birth dynamics (DB) the death event218
happens first where the individual on vj is chosen for death with probability219
di. The individual on vi is then chosen for birth conditional on the death of220
individual on vj with probability bij , thus rij = dibij . For link dynamics (L)221
both birth and death events happen simultaneously and therefore rij cannot be222
decomposed.223
For each of these dynamics, natural selection can influence the birth (‘B’ ap-224
pended to name) or death (‘D’ appended to name) event. We use the definitions225
of [28] who extensively studied a set of each of these dynamics. In terms of the226
exact formulae of the transition probabilities, we use those of [40] as summarised227
in Table 2. In these definitions, the dynamics are a function of the replacement228
structure W and the fitnesses of the individuals such that the individual on229
vertex vn has fitness Fn.230
3.2. Evolutionary dynamics in our framework231
In [8] a birth-death dynamics was defined to be used with the territorial232
raider model. In this section we shall develop a consistent set of dynamics233
for our framework. In particular, we will show that we can adapt the above234
dynamics widely used in evolutionary graph theory.235
To consider the evolution of the population it is useful to think of the in-236
dividuals in the population in an abstract way. In particular, individuals in237
the population change through time and, therefore, it is better to think of Ii238
as a position that an individual can occupy. These positions are referred to239
as I-vertices in [8] and have a particular relationship to the places, although240
as the population evolves the actual individual, and in particular the type of241
individual, occupying the position may change. We will generally simply refer242
to these I-vertices as “individuals” but make the distinction where necessary.243
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This leads to a natural way to create evolutionary dynamics for our frame-244
work; namely, by mapping each individual Ii to vertex vi, we can incorporate245
the replacement weights of different interaction methods straight into the for-246
mulae from Table 2. All that remains is to choose the replacement weights247
appropriately.248
The replacement weights used here are based on the assumption that an249
offspring of individual Ii is likely to replace another individual Ij proportional250
to the time Ii and Ij spend together. The offspring of Ii can also replace Ii251
itself and it does this proportional to the time Ii spends alone. Therefore, when252
i 6= j, the probability that Ii and Ij meet is given by summing χ(m,G) over all253
m such that i, j ∈ G. When they meet, we assume that Ii will spend an equal254
amount of time with each other individual in group G and, therefore, weight255
χ(m,G) with 1/(|G|− 1) since there are |G|− 1 other individuals (an alternative256
weighting could be 1/|G| that allows interaction within groups larger than one257
to contribute to the probability of Ii’s offspring replacing itself). Note that this258
is consistent with the payoffs from our public goods game, where each pairwise259
payoff equally contributes to the total payoff an individual receives. On the260
other hand, when i = j, we sum χ(m,G) over all m such that G = {i}. Here261
there is no need to weight χ(m,G) because Ii is alone.262
The replacement weights are therefore calculated as follows263
wij =

∑
m
∑
G
i,j∈G
χ(m,G)
|G| − 1 i 6= j,∑
m
χ(m, {i}) i = j.
(3.1)264
265
Thus we have a new set of evolutionary dynamics which can be applied to266
our framework in a wdie variety of situations (including those that we consider267
later in this paper). Note that the dynamics used in [8] is the BDB dynamics268
defined from the above process.269
By our definition W is symmetric, that is wij = wji ∀i, j, because the270
probability of Ii meeting Ij within any given group is clearly the same as that271
of Ij meeting Ii. We also have that W is doubly stochastic, that is 1 =
∑
j wij =272 ∑
i wij for all i, j, because wij is the proportion of time Ii spends with Ij (with273
wii the proportion of time it spends alone), and it is always in precisely one of274
these N categories. In this case, W is referred to as being isothermal [26, 40].275
We note that the results above hold because of the particular weights wij that276
we have chosen. Although these are natural, they are not the only possibility.277
In particular we could have alternative weights where wij and wji are not in278
general equal and/or where W is not isothermal.279
4. Fixation probability and the temperature280
4.1. The fixation probability281
The (mean) fixation probability ρC (ρD) is the probability that the offspring282
of a randomly placed mutant cooperator (defector) eventually replaces the entire283
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population. This can be uniformly at random as in [26]; alternatively, one can284
use the mutant appearance distribution as described in [2]. [8] used a version of285
this where they weighted the fixation probabilities using the mean temperature.286
For this current work we use the arithmetic mean, as the difference between287
these two approaches is negligible here, with the arithmetic mean being greater288
than or equal to the weighted mean [2]. For more details on how the fixation289
probability is calculated, see the Appendix.290
As in [50], we will use the neutral fixation probability 1/N as a benchmark291
when comparing cooperators and defectors using their fixation probabilities. In292
particular, [50] say that selection opposes D replacing C when ρC < 1/N and293
selection favours C replacing D when 1/N < ρC . It is said that type C evolves294
if both these conditions hold, i.e. if295
ρD < 1/N < ρC . (4.1)296297
4.2. Concepts of temperature298
In [26] the in temperature (or just the temperature) of a vertex of an evo-299
lutionary graph was introduced to measure how likely an individual occupying300
a particular vertex is to be replaced by another individual’s offspring. [28]301
extended this definition and introduced the out temperature of a vertex of an302
evolutionary graph to measure how likely the offpsring of the individual occupy-303
ing that vertex will replace another individual. These definitions of the in and304
out temperatures of individual In for an evolutionary graph W are respectively305
defined as follows306
T−n =
∑
i
win and T
+
n =
∑
i
wni. (4.2)307
308
In general, the in and out temperatures can be different. However, in our309
case, W is doubly stochastic and symmetric and, therefore, the in and out310
temperatures are identical. We therefore work with the definition of only in311
temperature and simply refer to it as the temperature.312
An alternative version of the definition of temperature (used in [8]) is the313
strict temperature that measures how often an individual is likely to be replaced314
by other individuals excluding itself. Since W is doubly stochastic, the strict315
temperature of individual In for an evolutionary graph W is given by316
Tn =
∑
i6=n
win = 1− wnn. (4.3)317
318
The definition of strict temperature can be extended to subpopulations to319
give the strict subpopulation temperature. This measures how likely an in-320
dividual in subpopulation Qm is to be replaced by an individual in another321
subpopulation. Clearly all individuals in a subpopulation have the same tem-322
perature (for any of our temperature definitions), since they all have the same323
movement distribution. The strict subpopulation temperature is calculated by324
11
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Figure 4: Comparing average fixation probability for different complete structures where fig-
ure (a) uses DBD dynamics and figure (b) uses DBB dynamics. Each number indicates a
subpopulation of a certain density. For example 60 is a complete structure with 2 subpopu-
lations of size 6 and 0 respectively; 2220 has three subpopulations of size 2 and one of size 0.
In each case the public goods game parameters are r = 30, v = 10 and movement parameter
is h = 30. We see that in figure (a) for the DBD dynamics, cooperators perform poorly in all
cases. In figure (b), cooperators do better for small groups (greater than one). Increasing the
number of empty places is beneficial for defectors.
summing all weights wij such that Ii is not part of subpopulation Qm and Ij is325
part of subpopulation Qm giving326
TQm =
∑
i∈N\Qm
∑
j∈Qm
wij . (4.4)327
328
This means that if there is only one subpopulation then its strict subpopulation329
temperature is 0 by definition, that is, TQm = 0 if Qm = N .330
We note that a strategy introduced in one subpopulation can spread through-331
out the population because W is strongly connected. This implies that if there332
is more that one non-empty subpopulation then the strict subpopulation tem-333
perature is non-zero for all non-empty subpopulations, that is, TQm > 0 if334
|Qm| > 0. To measure the connectedness of the subpopulations, that is how335
often the different subpopulations interact with one another, we use the mean336
strict subpopulation temperature that is defined as follows337
〈TQm〉 =
1
N
M∑
m=1
|Qm|TQm . (4.5)338
339
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Figure 5: Comparing average fixation
probability for different δ that is the
size (or density) of each subpopula-
tion in a complete graph with 4 sub-
populations. The public goods game
parameters are set to r = 30, v = 11,
the movement parameters are set to
h = 30 and dynamics used are DBB.
As in Figure 4, cooperators evolve
better in small groups (larger than 1),
namely groups of size two and three,
with a small advantage for groups of
size four.
5. Cooperation in generalized territorial raider models340
In this section we study the effect that different model parameters have341
on the evolution of cooperation. For models investigating the evolution of co-342
operation using evolutionary graph theory, both the evolution and interaction343
of individuals are dictated by a fixed structure, following games with a fixed344
number of players (almost always two). In our model the replacement struc-345
ture emerges from the interactions between individuals, involving games with a346
varying number of players, and therefore give us a different perspective on the347
evolution of cooperation.348
5.1. The effect of the dynamics349
As we mentioned in Section 1, for evolutionary graph theory models, coop-350
eration is favoured when using DBB or BDD dynamics, but not DBD or BDB351
dynamics, if the structure allows a cluster of cooperators to form (also see [36]).352
This is consistent with [8] where we studied the effect of the BDB dynamics353
on the public goods game and cooperators generally performed poorly. It was354
shown that defectors dominate regardless of the structure of the population and355
the game parameters. We are now in a position to revisit the public goods356
game with more flexibility both in terms of the dynamics and the structure of357
the population. In terms of the dynamics, the results for BDB and DBD are358
identical (as are those for BDD and DBB), because the replacement structure359
W is symmetric and doubly stochastic, so whether birth or death occurs first360
(but not whether selection occurs in the first or second position) is irrelevant,361
see Table 2. Furthermore, the LB and LD dynamics are equivalent to the BDB362
and DBD dynamics, respectively, because W is isothermal. This can be shown363
for LB dynamics (and similarly for LD dynamics) as follows364
rLBij =
Fiwij∑
n,k Fnwnk
=
Fiwij∑
n Fn (
∑
k wnk)
=
Fi∑
n Fn
wij = r
BDB
ij .365
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366
Thus in what follows, we only mention one dynamics from each pair, in each367
case the DB dynamics.368
For DBD dynamics, the defectors do better than cooperators regardless of369
the population structure. However, for DBB dynamics, cooperators are favoured370
over defectors for certain population structures. In particular, these structures371
that favour cooperators contain small subpopulations, ideally of two individuals.372
We can see this in Figure 4, where the fixation probability is plotted against373
different complete population structures for the DBD (Figure 4a) and DBB374
(Figure 4b) dynamics (as explained in the caption, for each population, each375
number in its representation corresponds to a subpopulation of that size). For376
example, for the complete structure 222 where there are 3 subpopulations of377
size 2, the cooperators outperform defectors by a large amount.378
To understand why this is the case, consider a population of two individuals379
where one individual is a cooperator and the other a defector. Within such a380
population, the cooperator will be less fit than the defector. For DBD dynamics,381
the least fit individual is most likely to be chosen for death and the fixation382
probability is proportional to the fitness of the individual. This means that383
a cooperator has a low fixation probability compared to a defector. However,384
when using DBB dynamics, one of the two individuals in randomly chosen for385
death and immediately replaced by the offspring of the other individual. This386
means that regardless of the fitness of the individual, each type will fixate with387
probability 1/2. For sufficiently high home fidelity parameter h, individuals388
primarily interact with their members of their own subpopulation. Therefore,389
in such a population where there exists a subpopulation of two individuals, a390
cluster of two cooperators is more likely to form when using DBB dynamics.391
This cluster of cooperators has a fitness larger than that of a cluster of defectors,392
provided that v > 1, thereby establishing a stronghold against defectors. In fact,393
a subpopulation of sufficiently small size (but greater than one) can establish a394
stronghold against defectors as shown in Figure 5. Here the fixation probability395
is plotted against a complete structure with four subpopulations that each have396
size ranging from 1 to 6. Subpopulations of size two are best for cooperation,397
with their advantage over defectors declining as the size of the subpopulation398
increases. Given the parameters used, subpopulations of two to four cooperators399
can successfully resist invasion, but larger subpopulations cannot.400
5.2. The effect of the temperature401
In [8] the strict temperature and mean group size were both shown to be402
strongly correlated with the fixation probability, with the effect of the former403
shown to be stronger. We therefore focus on the temperature, namely the strict404
subpopulation temperature. Note that in [8] there is one-to-one correspondence405
between individuals and places, which implies that the strict temperature and406
strict subpopulation temperature are identical, but this is not the case here.407
The individual temperature is a measure of how often an individual interacts408
with other individuals including those who are part of the same subpopulation;409
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Figure 6: Figure (a) plots the mean subpopulation temperature against the home fidelity h
for a complete population structure with 3 subpopulations of size 2 each. Figure (b) then
plots the fixation probabilities against these values of the mean subpopulation temperature
where r = 30 and v = 10 for the public goods game, and the dynamics used are DBB. In
particular, we notice that the fixation probability of the cooperators is decreasing with the
mean subpopulation temperature.
(1,12) (2,6) (3,4) (4,3) (6,2) (12,1)
Structures
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.10
0.11
0.12
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 F
ix
a
ti
o
n
 P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
 ρ
ρC  (Cooperator) ρD  (Defector) 1/N
Figure 7: Comparing different popu-
lation structures for the public goods
game with various complete graphs
for a population size of 12 where
(1,12) means there is 1 subpopulation
with 12 individuals, (2,6) means there
are 2 subpopulations with 6 individ-
uals and so on. We have set r = 30
and v = 10, home fidelity h = 30 and
the dynamics used is DBB.
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thus an individual may have a high temperature but that does not mean it is410
interacting with individuals from other subpopulations. In particular whenever411
individuals are not alone very often, this temperature does not vary so much412
between different individuals, and so is not a useful concept when there are non-413
trivial subgroups. The strict subpopulation temperature, on the other hand,414
considers interactions with individuals only from other subpopulations, and thus415
can be very variable. We shall see that this temperature is a good predictor of416
important population properties.417
The mean strict subpopulation temperature decreases when home fidelity418
increases as shown in Figure 6a. This is because the individuals are more likely419
to remain on their home place than visit another place as home fidelity increases,420
therefore reducing interactions with other subpopulations, and in particular the421
probability that a member of one subpopulation replaces a member of another422
at any given time.423
In [8] it was shown that for BDB dynamics for structures where each sub-424
population is of size one, there was a linear relationship between the strict425
(subpopulation) temperature and the fixation probability, with the higher the426
temperature, the stronger the effect of selection. We investigated this for DBB427
dynamics, and found an opposite linear effect, which is consistent with [28] who428
showed that the DBB dynamics suppresses the effect of selection the most for429
the complete graph. We note that this relationship only holds for relatively430
weak selection, and we can reverse the relationship (and make it non-linear) by431
increasing the value of the reward.432
To promote cooperation we need a structure involving a subpopulation of433
size at least two. However, whether these structures promote cooperation or434
not also depends upon the base fitness and reward, and so we assume that the435
base fitness and reward are sufficiently large for this to be the case, see Section436
5.4. In this case, decreasing the temperature by increasing the home fidelity437
promotes cooperation. In particular, the relationship between the mean fixa-438
tion probability of cooperators and the mean strict subpopulation temperature439
is negative and nonlinear as shown in Figure 6b. The nonlinearity arises not440
only from the nonlinear payoff function of the public good game, but also from441
the fact that there exists a subpopulation that has size at least two. For co-442
operators, the mean fixation probability is negatively correlated with the mean443
strict subpopulation temperature because the mean strict subpopulation tem-444
perature is highest when home fidelity is lowest, i.e. when cooperators cannot445
separate themselves from the population and form clusters, consequently defec-446
tion evolves. On the other hand, for low mean strict subpopulation temperature,447
and so high home fidelity, it is easier to form clusters of cooperators that allows448
cooperation to evolve. This kind of behaviour is also evident in Figures 4 and449
7.450
5.3. The effect of the number of places451
In [8] each individual had their home place and there were no empty places452
(non home places) that individuals could visit. In our case, individuals can453
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Figure 8: Figure (a) shows the effect of compensating for empty places by increasing the home
fidelity such that the probability of staying in their home place, pnn, remains the same. We
start at h = 30 for the 33 and 222 structures. As an empty place is added, h is increased
so that pnn = 30/31 for the 330,. . . ,330000 structures and pnn = 30/32 for 2220,. . . ,222000
structures. In all cases r = 30 and v = 10. We can see that after compensating for the above
effect, the influence of introducing empty places is both reversed and weakened. Figure (b)
shows the mean strict subpopulation temperature dropping off when we compensate for the
empty places by increasing the home fidelity such that pnn remains the same.
visit non home places and we therefore investigate what effect this has on the454
evolution of cooperation.455
As seen in Figure 4, increasing the number of empty places that subpopu-456
lations can visit, whilst keeping all other parameters constant, makes it more457
difficult for cooperation to evolve. In particular, this effect is prominent for458
structures where cooperators were initially doing well. For example, for the459
structure 222 where the cooperators do best, increasing the number of places460
significantly reduces their fixation probability whilst increasing that of the de-461
fectors. Here increasing the number of places acts in the same way as decreasing462
the home fidelity, i.e. as decreasing the amount of time an individual spends in463
its home place with members of its subpopulation. Thus the amount of time464
an individual spends alone or with individuals not from its subpopulation in-465
creases, so that the overall fitness of a cooperative subpopulation will decrease466
(they still pay a cost but do not receive a benefit when alone). In terms of467
the dynamics, spending more time alone would increase the effect of selection468
in DBB dynamics because an individual with higher fitness that is randomly469
chosen for death is more likely to be replaced by its own offspring, which affects470
the cooperators adversely. A cooperative subpopulation will also have lower471
fitness because its members are more likely to interact with individuals from472
other subpopulations, therefore exposing them to defectors. The increased in-473
teraction between individuals will also increase the effect of selection in DBB474
dynamics because an individual with higher fitness that is randomly chosen for475
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death is less likely to be replaced by an individual with lower fitness in the same476
subpopulation.477
The increase in the number of places can be compensated for by increasing478
the home fidelity, so that individuals stay in their home place with the same479
probability. This has the effect of decreasing the mean strict subpopulation480
temperature as individuals are more likely to spend time with members of their481
subpopulation. This is shown in Figure 8, where we can see that the effect of482
adding empty places is now reversed, although the strength of this reverse effect483
is weak.484
5.4. The effect of a large home fidelity485
Consider a well-mixed population of M subpopulations each containing L486
individuals, so that N = ML, as described in Section 2.3, where h is very487
large. Consequently from equation (3.1), χ(m,G) is approximately 1 if G = Qm,488
and is approximately 0 otherwise. Thus the fitness of an individual can be489
evaluated assuming that we have a group containing precisely all individuals490
from its subpopulation with probability 1. Due to the symmetric nature of our491
population, the weights for any two individuals in the same subpopulation will492
be the same, as will the weights for any two members of different subpopulations.493
Denoting the latter as wO, which will be small, we have wij = wO when Ii and494
Ij are not in the same subpopulation, and wij = wI ≈ [1−(M−1)LwO]/(L−1)495
otherwise, with the probability of self-replacement negligible.496
It follows that only replacements within subpopulations will happen, except497
very rarely. Thus we can assume that the battle within any mixed subpopulation498
of cooperator (C) and defector (D) individuals will be resolved with fixation of499
one type or the other before any new mixed subpopulation appears.500
We thus consider a two stage process. Firstly, a new mixed group appears.501
This occurs rarely, through the invasion of a cooperator into a defector subpop-502
ulation, or a defector into a cooperator subpopulation. Assuming that there are503
currently MC(MD = M −MC) cooperator (defector) subpopulations, such a504
transition happens with probability505
pCI =
MD
M
MCLwOFL(C)
(L− 1)wIFL(D) +O(wO) (5.1)506
of a cooperator into a defector subpopulation, or507
pDI =
MC
M
MDLwOFL(D)
(L− 1)wIFL(C) +O(wO) (5.2)508
of a defector into a cooperator subpopulation. The terms FL(C) and FL(D) are509
the fitnesses of cooperator and defector individuals within their own subpopu-510
lations, and are obtained directly from equations (2.4) and (2.6), and the terms511
O(wO) are of the order of wO, and very small. Further denoting x = v/[r(L−1)]512
we obtain that the ratio of the two expressions in equations (5.1) and (5.2), and513
thus the relative frequency that the new invasions happen, is thus514
pCI
pDI
≈
(
FL(C)
FL(D)
)2
=
(
1 +
v − 1
r
)2
≈ (1 + (L− 1)x)2 (5.3)515
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for large v and r.516
The second process considers fixation within a well-mixed group of size L.517
Following [23] we obtain the formula518
xi =
1 +
∑i−1
j=1
∏j
k=1
δk
βk
1 +
∑L−1
j=1
∏j
k=1
δk
βk
, (5.4)519
for the fixation probability of i cooperators within a population of size L. Here520
βk (δk) is the probability that the next event is the replacement of a defector521
(cooperator) by a cooperator (defector), when the number of cooperators is k.522
We have here523
δk =
k(L− k)
L
r + kvL−1
(L− 1)r + ((L− k)k + (k − 1)2) vL−1 − (k − 1)
, (5.5)524
525
βk =
k(L− k)
L
r + (k−1)vL−1 − 1
(L− 1)r + ((L− k − 1)k + k(k − 1)) vL−1 − k
. (5.6)526
For sufficiently large r, we obtain527
δk
βk
≈ 1 + kx
1 + (k − 1)xfk(x), (5.7)528
where529
fk(x) =
L− 1 + (L− 2)kx
L− 1 + ((L− 2)k + 1)x < 1. (5.8)530
The fixation probability of a single cooperator in a group of defectors is given531
by ρC,L = x1, and the fixation probability of a single defector in a group of532
cooperators is ρD,L = 1− xL−1. We thus have533
ρD,L
ρC,L
=
L−1∏
k=1
δk
βk
=
L−1∏
k=1
1 + kx
1 + (k − 1)xfk(x) = (1 + (L− 1)x)
L−1∏
k=1
fk(x). (5.9)534
535
This implies that536
pCI
pDI
>
ρD,L
ρC,L
. (5.10)537
Following our assumptions, the population evolves following a succession of538
invasions of subpopulations either of cooperators by defectors or of defectors by539
cooperators. The probability that the next such event will be the invasion of a540
subpopulation of defectors by a cooperator is simply541
pCIρC,L
pCIρC,L + pDIρD,L
=
rS
1 + rS
, (5.11)542
where rS = pCIρC,L/pDIρD,L is the forward bias [40] of cooperative groups543
within our population. For a cooperator to fixate in the population it must first544
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fixate within its group with probability ρC,L, after which, there is a competition545
between groups proceeding precisely as in a Moran process, so that we have546
ρC = ρC,L
1− 1/rS
1− (1/rS)M , (5.12)547
with the equivalent expression for ρD,548
ρD = ρD,L
rS − 1
rMS − 1
. (5.13)549
It is clear from equation (5.10) that rS > 1, so that ρC is greater than ρC,L(1−550
1/rS) for any M . Letting M become large means that 1/N = 1/ML will be less551
than ρC , but larger than ρD, so that inequality (4.1) holds. This means that552
for sufficiently large h, r and v, we have that cooperation evolves for any given553
subpopulation size L. Thus cooperation can potentially evolve for arbitrarily554
large subpopulations, although as we have seen previously, it is easier for smaller555
subpopulations.556
6. Discussion557
In [10] a new framework for the flexible modelling of structured populations558
using multiplayer interactions was introduced, see also [8, 13, 11]. This work559
built on classical evolutionary graph theory, but was limited in terms of the560
dynamics used. In this paper we have developed this framework further. Most561
importantly we have developed a full range of dynamics to apply in the frame-562
work, which will allow us to consider many different evolutionary scenarios. In563
particular these can be applied for the fully independent model in general, not564
just the examples considered here, enabling us to use a fuller range of the pos-565
sibilities that our flexible framework allows. Thus this paper can be thought to566
complete the basic development phase of our work.567
We have then developed the fully independent model to incorporate subpop-568
ulations and in particular consider a generalized version of the territorial raider569
model introduced in [8]. This is beneficial because previously the fully inde-570
pendent model, represented in the bipartite graph in Figure 1, would require571
a vertex for every individual as well as an additional vertex for every available572
place. Now we just need a vertex per subpopulation, potentially allowing a573
small number of very large subpopulations to be considered, which would not574
have been possible previously. Furthermore, generalizing the territorial raider575
model in this allows modelling of more complex movement behaviour as seen576
in, for example, African wild dogs that live in packs [17].577
This type of structure has been considered in a slightly different context,578
for example, the island- or community-structured populations of [53]. In this579
model interactions occur at multiple levels, interactions between community580
members being more common than those with non-community members where581
interaction occurs at multiple levels. Members of one community first play a582
public goods game and then join the members of another community and play a583
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public goods game such that, at the highest level, the entire population plays a584
public goods game. This is in contrast to our case, where individuals only play585
a game if they are present in the same place at the same time. They showed586
that cooperation can evolve when DBB dynamics are used and selection is weak587
within communities, which is consistent with our results.588
We note that the framework of [8] is capable of modelling far wider be-589
haviour than that developed here, in particular it is able to consider dynamic590
populations whose distributions continuously change due to their history, and591
the interactions that they have. Thus it can incorporate the type of situations592
with mobile populations modelled in [55, 47]. In particular, movement can fol-593
low a stochastic process in which the individuals move depending upon their594
current state as in [16]. In a soon to be recently submitted paper [39] we have595
developed a Markov chain version of our model similar to this, and again con-596
sider a combination of theoretical developments and the specific application of597
the evolution of cooperation.598
We then applied our new methodology to an example, considering the evolu-599
tion of cooperation within a population involving subpopulations. We saw as in600
evolutionary graph theory that the choice of dynamics is crucial, and that DBD601
(and BDB) dynamics would not allow cooperation to evolve, but that DBB (and602
BDD) would, which is consistent with [36]. Further, using the latter dynamics,603
the size and the level of isolation of the subpopulations is important, with the604
smaller the subpopulations and the greater the isolation, the greater the chance605
for cooperation to evolve. Unsurprisingly, the larger the level of reward v, the606
better the cooperators do. In particular, the larger the subpopulations, the607
larger the reward v required for cooperation to evolve; note that this is similar608
to the requirement that the benefit-to-cost ratio exceeds the average number of609
neighbours an individual has from [36].610
We see from Figure 6 that our new idea of strict subgroup temperature611
is important in explaining the level of cooperation that evolves. Low (high)612
temperature helps promote the invasion of cooperators (defectors). In particu-613
lar, higher temperatures allow cooperators to cluster more strongly and benefit614
more from cooperating with one another. We note that this raises a more gen-615
eral question about temperature. Within subpopulation temperature includes616
replacement weights between pairs of individuals from different subpopulations,617
but excludes weights between pairs from within the same subpopulation. What618
if two individuals have very similar, but not identical, movement distributions619
(and thus whilst formally not within the same subpopulation, for practical pur-620
poses they might as well be)? Under the current definition no distinction is made621
between this and two individuals whose distributions are completely different.622
We will investigate this question in later work.623
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Appendix A.776
A state of the population gives the type of each individual in the population.777
Let S be a state of the population such that n ∈ S if and only if In is a778
cooperator. There are then 2N different states of which N (∅) is the state in779
which there are all cooperators (defectors). Using any dynamics, the probability780
of transitioning from state S to S ′ is defined as follows781
PSS′ =
∑
i∈S
rij for S ′ = S ∪ {j}, or
∑
i/∈S
rij for S ′ = S \ {j}, or
∑
i,j∈S
i,j /∈S
rij for S ′ = S,
(A.1)
782
783
or 0 otherwise.784
Cooperators (defectors) is said to fixate from state S in the population when,785
starting from state S, every defector (cooperator) is replaced by a cooperator786
(defector), that is the population reaches state N (∅). At this point no further787
changes are possible, since one type is extinct, and so the population remains788
in this state. Let ρCS be the probability that cooperators fixate from any initial789
state S, then this is obtained by solving the following system of equations790
ρCS =
∑
S′
PSS′ρCS′ (A.2)791
792
with boundary conditions793
ρC∅ =0 and ρ
D
N = 1 (A.3)794795
where PSS′ is the probability of transitioning from state S to S ′. The probability796
ρBS that defectors fixate from any initial state S is obtained in the same way797
with the boundary conditions reversed.798
The mean fixation probability of cooperators (defectors) is a, potentially,799
weighted average of the probabilities ρCS (ρ
D
S ), over S when there is only one800
cooperator (defector) in the population, that is |S| = 1 (|S| = N−1). There are801
two common weightings used; uniformly weighted (as we use here) or weighted802
in proportion to the mutant appearance distribution as defined in [2].803
The evolution of the population is essentially described by an absorbing804
Markov chain. The mean fixation probability is therefore calculated by com-805
puting the state transition probabilities that are then used to construct the806
state transition matrix of the Markov chain. The state transition matrix is then807
26
used to calculate the fixation probability see, for example, [23] for explanation808
of how this is done. Note that no simulations were run to calculate the fixation809
probability, rather, all the states of the population were explicitly calculated.810
27
